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HYBRIDITY AND POLITICAL DISORDER: 
A MIXED METHOD APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING THE HYBRID REGIME 
PARADOX 
Bryce Jamison Kleinsteuber 
April 9, 2019 
This thesis focuses on two central questions; first, does regime hybridity 
lead to an increased propensity for political disorder; and second, what specific 
regime level characteristics are responsible for the increased propensity. The 
theoretical basis for this study is founded in the understanding that the duality of 
Hybrid regimes ensures that they receive neither the benefit of Authoritarian, 
coercive force nor Democratic plasticity and thus are unable to prevent political 
disorder. Therefore, during periods of political transition leaders in these regimes 
not only cannot prevent these events but may be incentivized to allow or even 
encourage certain events as a means for citizens to vent political frustration. 
Hybrid regimes are a topic central to comparative politics, yet work is only now 
beginning to study specific facets and characteristics of these regimes. Thus, 
scholars are just beginning to explore hybrid regime characteristics and how they 
impact critical political activities, is especially true concerning a topic of utmost 
importance, political disorder. The paper utilizes the PRIO data on Urban Social 
Disorder to first verify that Hybrid regimes suffer from an increased propensity for 
political disorder, before proceeding to a case study on Algeria. This case study 
v 
focuses on journalistic accounts of political disorder. By employing a content 
analysis of Newspaper articles, the causal mechanism at play is highlighted.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There is a long tradition in political science of studying governmental 
structure; this can be tied all the way back to Aristotle’s famous work Politics. In 
modern scholarship, the focus upon the rules, regulations, and institutional 
makeup of states has been classified as the study of regime type. It is easy to 
understand why scholars would choose to focus on this topic, both in ancient 
times and more recently. The nature and characteristics of the polis, and in 
modern times, of the state have significant repercussions for the humans who 
inhabit them. 
However, in the past two decades this research has certainly taken on a 
nature different from what any scholar previously would have predicted. The 
dominant theme of government structure heading into the twenty-first century 
was the idea that with the collapse of communism all governments would begin 
the process of democratization and democratic consolidation (Fukuyama 1992). 
While Fukuyama was correct about some aspects of the future, he and 
other scholars at the time did not know, and could not have known, that a new 
regime type was in the process of solidifying its place in the world. Scholars were 
quick to take note of a growing number of states that looked neither like full 
democracies nor like authoritarian regimes. Termed hybrid regimes, they are the 
most recent example of regimes that fail to fit into traditional regime categories. 
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While the field has yet to settle decisively upon a single term to encompass these 
regimes, this paper will use the term hybrid regimes (see Diamond 2015 for a 
reference definition for this term). 
Hybrid regimes are unique in their construction from the characteristics of 
both democratic regimes and authoritarian regimes (see Levitsky and Way 2010, 
for examples). Scholarly concurrence can primarily be found on two fronts as it 
relates to hybrid regimes: first, that these regimes both exist and are significantly 
different from the two other major types of regimes to warrant their own 
classification and study (Diamond 2015); and second, that it is critical to 
understand how these significant differences with regards to regime type 
influence both the behavior of the state and the behavior of people within the 
state is critical. 
It is where these new regimes intersect with political disorder, and 
precisely how they may give rise to political disorder, that concerns this paper. 
Political disorder is a broad term that encapsulates many types of behaviors, but 
they all share a common trait: a group of individuals organized on the basis of 
some political goal or motivation.1 According to the Peace Research Institute of 
Oslo, the organization which produced one of the datasets employed in this 
paper, includes protests, demonstrations, riots, and armed conflict all as types of 
political disorder. 
1 While the term utilized for this paper will be political disorder, as that is the term utilized by the PIRO 
dataset, there are other terms which have also been applied to this collection of activities. The term 
which will most closely fit with the observed activities is Contentious Politics. This term will be defined 
and addressed further in the literature review section of this paper.  
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In a similar fashion to the study of regimes, the study of political disorder 
has seen a recent growth of scholarship and change or expansion in focus. Even 
before the collapse of the Soviet bloc scholars in the field were aware of the new 
way in which people were engaging in political disorder (Tilly 1978, for example). 
This new form of disorder (as opposed to civil wars, which previously held the 
main focus in the study of political violence) spanned a spectrum of activities 
ranging from non-violent protest to armed attempts at challenging the state. The 
study of political violence based around urban population centers rather than the 
traditional agrarian based insurgencies, as was typically seen in civil wars, has 
exploded in terms of both scholarship and real-world occurrences. This explosion 
of urban-based public disorder was on full display throughout the Arab Spring, 
both in terms of occurrence and in terms of scholarly attention (for example of 
this literature see Bennett 2012, or Lynch 2014). 
Scholars are deeply divided on the grounds of how these new forms of 
political violence related to more traditional forms. Some have embraced this new 
urban mass-mobilization political activity as a new façade to an old tradition, and 
thus have readily applied previous theories as explanations (Tilly and Tarrow, 
2015). Others have asserted that they are born out of new causes, and thus we 
are only seeing their rise to prominence now.  
This thesis concerns itself directly with bridging the gap between hybrid 
regimes and political disorder. Specifically, the task set forth within this paper is 
to understand how the combination of regime characteristics present in hybrid 
regimes leads to an increased propensity for political disorder.  
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Therefore, this paper is an attempt to contribute to both of these critical 
topics and to do so it will address a set of critical questions: Are hybrid regimes 
more likely to display a higher propensity for political disorder events? What 
characteristics within hybrid regimes result in the increased propensity for 
political disorder? 
The assertion of the overall paper is that hybrid regimes display an 
increased propensity for political disorder events. 
H1: If regime hybridity increases, then occurrences of political disorder 
events will also increase. 
Furthermore, this paper also concerns itself with uncovering the causal 
process through which hybrid regime characteristics encourage political disorder. 
The hypothesized mechanism tested in this paper is that the allowance of 
opposition parties is responsible for the increase in political disorder. 
H2: The presence of opposition political parties in hybrid regimes is the 
causal mechanism through which increasing propensity for political 
disorder arises. 
This paper is essential for several reasons. First, it examines the paradox 
of hybrid regimes, something that has yet to be fully explored. Up to this point, 
most scholarship has been primarily focused on setting out typologies or 
categories for these new hybrid regimes to various degrees of success. Attempts 
at answering crucial research questions, for example, regarding how the hybridity 
of these regimes affects broader governmental characteristics, is one of the 
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primary concerns for the field. Secondly, the identification of factors or variables 
that affect the propensity of hybrid regimes to experience political disorder could 
be utilized in thinking about how to provide stability in these regimes. Finally, 
political scientists have often seen the purposeful weakening of democratic 
institutions as perplexing, witnessing actors who seem to be weakening their own 
ability to govern effectively. Hybrid regimes have often taken the act of restricting 
their own institutions to the extreme. Thus, an examination of how hybrid regimes 
survive with eroded democratic safeguards while experiencing high levels of 
dissent may lead to a better understanding of not only hybrid stability, but the 
logic behind institutional weakening. 
This paper is organized as follows: section two explores, the existing 
literature on the topic of hybrid regimes and political disorder and examines the 
emerging question of new hybrid regimes may interact with political. Section 
three explores the theory proposed by this thesis and explains the causal 
mechanism. In section four the research design, for the statistical analysis and 
case study portion of the research are explained. In section five the results from 
the statistical analysis are presented and discussed. In section six the results 
from the content analysis of newspaper articles from the case study on Algiers, 
Algeria is revealed, and some historical background on the case is provided. 
Finally, section seven features the discussion of the summation of the findings of 
this paper as well as the conclusion to the paper. 
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2. EXISTING LITERATURE
This section of the paper focuses itself on addressing the existing 
literature that has built up around both hybrid regimes and political disorder. 
Through the existing literature, two things become apparent: first the extensive 
scholarly traditions that exist surrounding both topics, but also the current gap 
that exists around their intersection that the thesis hopes to contribute to 
bridging. The outline for this section is first an extensive review of hybrid regime 
literature, then a review of the existing literature on political disorder, and finally a 
brief look at the works that have found themselves at the intersection of the two 
topics. 
Hybrid Regime Literature Review 
The first mention of hybrid regimes comes from Terry Lynn Karl (1995) in 
response to the observed Central American states that displayed both 
democratic and authoritarian characteristics. Scholars did not gravitate to this 
term until much later. Instead, in the interim period between the writings of Terry 
Lynn Karl and the modern resurgence of the term hybrid regimes, a plethora of 
concepts, terms, and typologies were created, resulting in a chaotic maelstrom of 
previous scholarship. 
This chaos can be organized into three schools of classification. The first 
school arose relatively shortly after the work by Karl and focused heavily on the 
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democratic characteristics of these regimes. Broadly this group of literature has 
been termed democracy with adjectives (Collier and Levitsky 1997). Mainly in 
response to this wave of scholarship the second classification was formed. The 
second classification responded by highlighting the authoritarian features 
maintained by these regimes, in direct contrast to the first group. Finally, scholars 
have recently returned to the term hybrid regime, choosing either to focus on 
both authoritarian and democratic traits equally, or to highlight the fact that 
regimes exist in a multi-dimensional space, rather than on a single spectrum. 
Democracy with Adjectives 
The first significant classification group mostly follows after the end of the 
Cold War and is primarily influenced by Huntington’s theories. By focusing on the 
procedural definition of democracy, developed from the work of Joseph 
Schumpeter (1942), scholars undoubtedly noticed numerous regimes that almost 
meet the definition and thus began the process of adding adjectives to typify 
these new regimes. However, as scholars became increasingly aware of these 
regimes and their inability to meet even a procedural minimum definition, they 
remained focused on the democratic features the regimes did possess. Some 
scholars have suggested that this focus is a direct result of the work by 
Huntington (1991) as expectations surrounding democratic consolidation during 
this time-period were greatly heightened (Collier and Levitsky 1997). 
Thus, the literature around this time-period became plagued with vague 
terms like ‘illiberal democracy’ or ‘transitional democracy,’ which were usually 
applied to a subset of the total population of non-democratic, non-authoritarian 
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regimes, leaving the scholarship quite disorganized (Zakaria 1997, and Hamot 
1998). Each of these scholars set out a typology for portions of these regimes 
through the establishment of their own standards and characteristics. The studies 
conducted during this gold-rush time-period ranged from incorporating vast 
swaths of these unaccounted-for regimes to sometimes singling out two 
countries for classification (O’Donnell 1994, Garreton 2003, and Barnes 1998). 
Despite their weaknesses, these studies did manage to bring increased scholarly 
attention to the growing number of cases unaccounted for by current terminology. 
Ultimately none of the individual typologies have remained in the 
scholarship, though towards the end of the twentieth century, there were several 
attempts to consolidate the sum of these adjective democracies to come up with 
a useful composite. These works were both crucial in both highlighting the 
number of cases that existed that current regime typology did not capture and 
highlighting the need for a single term for them. However, neither of these works 
which attempted to bridge all of the literature surrounding democracy-with-
adjectives advanced their own singular term as they both focused on bringing 
about cohesion to the field (Collier and Levitsky 1997, and Collier and Adcock 
1999). 
The minute yet critical differences between typologies which prohibited a 
unified field from forming may ultimately be to blame for the fading of scholarship 
focused on the democratic aspects of regimes. Scholars, potentially unsatisfied 
with the lack of consensus being brought about purely by focusing on the 
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democratic facets of the regimes, turned instead to focus on the authoritarian 
aspects. 
Beyond Democracy 
The second wave of scholarship in the field of hybrid regimes can be 
typified as a response and opposition to the first wave. It is important to note that 
at times the scholars in this field may have been focusing on cases in such a 
manner as not to have seen contestation between themselves and previous 
scholarship in such terms. The primary focus of this period of scholarship was 
around viewing these uncategorized regimes through an authoritarian lens. The 
other significant difference that exists between this period of scholarship and the 
previous democratic period is the more consolidated research and scholarship 
that took place. As opposed to a large number of scattered writings and 
categories, three typologies, and thereby three main avenues of research, came 
to dominate this period. While other smaller works indeed did exist, attention 
during this time is and has been focused mostly around the major three works of 
scholarship. These three major works are Schedler’s Electoral Authoritarianism 
(2002, 2006, and 2015), Ottaway’s Semi-authoritarianism (2003 and 2013), and 
Levitsky and Way’s Competitive Authoritarianism (2002 and 2010). 
Schedler’s work highlights that these regimes are not democracies that 
have failed to meet the all of the minimum requirements needed to be considered 
fully democratic, and that they are instead authoritarian regimes that have 
adopted elections as a means of increasing regime legitimacy (Schedler 2006). 
By focusing more heavily upon the authoritarian nature of these regimes a more 
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pragmatic and practical view of these institutions and their purposes was 
reached. It is also apparent that these regimes are moving to allow elections as a 
strategic political choice, rather than being forced to do so. This work 
undoubtedly laid the foundation of thinking as one of the first major works to 
appear in direct contestation to previous scholarship. However, the major 
shortcoming of this work stems from the concentration on the potentially 
democratizing effect of autocracies implementing elections thus subverting their 
durability. 
Ottaway’s conceptualization of semi-authoritarianism follows in much the 
same respect as Schedler’s conceptualization. Ottaway seems potentially more 
suspicious of these new electoral institutions than previous scholarship, and with 
a stronger emphasis on the lack of true contestation (Ottaway 2013). 
Comparatively, Ottaway views these new institutions as democratic trappings, 
whereas Schedler views them as institutions of uncertainty. This is not to say that 
Ottaway does not make a case for the ability of these regimes to transition, or 
even the case that they are not distinct from other autocracies. Indeed, there is 
room within this work for regimes to remain stable, in a concept known as regime 
equilibrium. Where this work shows growth from previous scholarship is in the 
focus on informal coercive mechanisms that must be employed to avoid 
international attention and maintain some semblance of democracy. This has 
substantial implications for hybrid regimes and is of particular importance to this 
work as it focuses on political disorder an event that requires some form of 
answer from the regime. 
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Levitsky and Way’s work conceptually is in many ways situated in the 
middle ground between Ottaway and Schedler. Their work has the added benefit 
though of being the most stringent in terms of regime characteristic requirements. 
Focusing both on the presence of certain institutions - like multi-party elections, 
and a plural media environment - and the violation of one of three primary 
democratic attributes: free elections, broad civil liberties, and a reasonably level 
playing field (Levitsky and Way 2010). This work makes two significant 
contributions to the field. First, is the dual understanding that the competition that 
occurs in these regimes is real, but entirely unfair. Second is the idea that 
elections may serve two distinct purposes: the first purpose is increased regime 
legitimacy by citing successful elections, and the second is the ability for people 
to predictably build opposition. 
The summation of the contributions from these three seminal works is a 
clear emphasis on regimes that possess the electoral institutions of democracy 
(at least for the executive) but fail to uphold free and fair elections. Theoretically, 
this is important as a source of political disorder can be seen in this typology as 
outlined. 
The one feature that all three of these significant works share though is 
the recognition of a wide swath of regimes that exist between fully authoritarian 
and fully democratic, and while they all encompass differing amounts of this 
spectrum, they all acknowledge it. Furthermore, they all utilize the term ‘hybrid 
regime’ to define the totality of these regimes. This demonstrates the 
solidification that has taken place in scholarship regarding the terminology of 
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these regimes since the beginning of the twenty-first century. This brings us to 
the last grouping of scholarship, which focuses not on these regimes as being 
democratic or authoritarian, but as regime typologies distinctly unique enough to 
necessitate unique terminology. 
The Resurgence of Hybrid regimes 
The return to utilizing the terminology as it was laid out in 1995 seems to 
be the trajectory of recent scholarship. The defining feature of this scholarship is 
the multi-dimensionality of regimes. Regime competitiveness has been one of the 
most critical conceptualizations to come from this most recent scholarship 
(Diamond 2015, and Gilbert and Mohseni 2011). It has also been marked by 
attempts to bring together all, or most, of the past attempts at regime typifying in 
order to bring about order to the field.  
In the last decade and a half, scholarship on the topic of hybrid regimes 
has grown substantially. This has grown from focusing on the categorization of 
regimes which much of the previously mentioned scholarship dealt with, to 
understanding how hybrid regimes function differently from their democratic or 
authoritarian counterparts. Some of these scholars have dealt with trying to come 
up with precise measurement and analysis strategies for hybrid regimes (Ekman 
2009, Wigell 2008, Bogaards 2009, and Morlino 2009). Others still have 
emphasized the importance of hybrid regimes to democratic consolidation and 
transition (Brownlee 2009, Howard and Roessler 2006, Donno 2013, and Bunce 
and Wolchik 2010). Another group of scholars has focused attention on how 
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hybridity affects the outcomes of social movements and protests (Roberson 
2010, Greene 2014, and Wheatley and Zurcher 2008). 
Critiques 
Through the tracing of the evolution of the scholarship on hybrid regimes, 
it is apparent that previous scholarship has several gaps. First, due to 
scholarship taking decades to find common ground on a term for these new 
regimes (in addition to the time it took to recognize their emergence), scholarship 
focused on the characteristics of these new regimes has been slow in coming 
about. It is only within the past few years that significant scholarly attention and 
effort has been placed on attempting to understand these regimes. It is vital to try 
to understand how the characteristics of these regimes impact their actions and 
behavior. 
Second, there is some evident bias in early scholarship which focused 
attention too heavily upon only certain kinds of institutions. Scholars in both of 
the first two waves could rightly be accused of focusing attention too heavily 
upon only institutions of one kind. The first wave of scholarship was evident in its 
emphasis placed on democratic institutions. The second wave similarly placed 
more attention on authoritarian institutions. This oversight by early scholars to 
take a balanced approach and recognize the equal importance of both types of 
institutions has resulted in a bias permeating the work done on understanding the 
characteristics of these regimes. Therefore, it is with a skeptical eye that one 
must view works from the first two waves of scholarships when considering their 
assertions about the role of institutions, and characteristics of the regimes. 
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Finally, while scholarship has undoubtedly exploded in a plethora of 
differing directions, adequate attention has not yet been paid to one of the most 
critical topics in modern-day political science. Political disorder, in its many forms, 
has yet to be explored thoroughly with respect to regime hybridity. While some 
attempt has been made, it fails to explore a causal mechanism that is at work 
(Urdal and Hoelscher 2012). It is these three significant gaps in the hybrid regime 
literature which this paper hopes to aid in filling. 
Political Disorder Literature Review 
The term political disorder as it applies to this thesis encompasses a wide 
array of topics. Turning to the definition that is utilized by the Peace Research 
Institute of Oslo’s Urban Social Disorder dataset, 
The dataset covers different forms of violent and nonviolent politically 
motivated disorder, including demonstrations, rioting, terrorism, and 
armed conflict.2   
This broad swath of activities may seem to make it difficult to know what 
literature should be explored regarding previous scholarship. In order to deal with 
this recognized difficulty in selecting which scholarly tradition to focus on, two 
scholarly traditions are explored in this literature review. First is a review of the 
literature on civil war. Civil war literature that has arisen over the propensity for 
countries to experience civil war is selected as one approach because it 
represents the most extreme of the events covered by the dataset. By focusing 
on the extremity, the hope is that the other, less extreme events may stem from 
similar causes, and thus share an explanation and theory. The second approach 
2 Urdal and Hoelscher 2012, pp. 516 
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is to focus on the literature surrounding contentious politics. This term seeks to 
combine a wide array of social movements citing the common traits that are 
shared between them. 
Civil War 
Scholarship on civil war has grown substantially in the past two decades, 
as attention in mainstream scholarship turned its attention from interstate war to 
intrastate conflict. This trend has reflected the trend in the world of conflict being 
predominately associated with within state conflict rather than between state 
conflict (see Fearon & Laitin 2003 for an overview of this trend).  
Scholars after becoming aware of this trend turned to understand what 
was driving this trend and what determined or influenced a country’s propensity 
for experiencing civil conflict. From this scholarship, several important findings 
remain today.  
The first significant group of scholarship to develop around civil wars and 
their causes argued that civil wars arose when there exists an identifiable group 
of people that were systematically denied access to power (Gurr 1993, and 
Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Access to power in this scholarship can mean several 
things simultaneously. For example, it could mean an ethnic group being denied 
the right to vote or to have their voice represented. It could stem from the 
persecution of candidates on religious grounds. These various denials of access 
have spawned terms such as material deprivation to define the nature of the 
denial of access to power. Putting aside what access to power means in any 
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particular context, though, the explanation forwarded by these scholars was that 
civil wars resulted from the persistent denial of power and opportunity relative to 
other ethnoreligious groups.  This scholarship has since been coined the 
“Grievance Explanation” of civil war. 
This second major grouping of scholarship arose in direct contestation 
with the first. The second camp that arose asserted that the motivations for 
participation were typically not as noble as the Grievance Explanation may imply, 
but instead arose from the presence of lootable resources. Individuals might 
claim to be engaged in rebellion for a myriad of reasons but underneath it all they 
were primarily concerned with economic gain for themselves. Typically, in the 
Greed Explanation for civil war, there exists a group that is systematically denied 
access to economic advantages. One of the most common sources of this stems 
directly from states that are burdened or cursed with mineral wealth (Ross 2004, 
Humphreys 2005, and Ross 2006). This camp has been coined the Greed 
Explanation of civil war. 
Unfortunately, these findings were at odds with more qualitative 
scholarship that found deep divisions along religious and ethnic lines that 
accounted for a countries probability of experiencing civil conflict. Furthermore, 
this work countered the claims made by both previous scholarships, citing not 
individual motivations as the reason people would join, but more profound 
cultural sentiments which made joining the fight necessary. Instead of focusing 
on the rational reasons that might account for someone to join in the armed 
rebellion against the state, this scholarship sought underlying cultural motivators, 
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things like ideology or religion (Wood 2003). The reason that Wood and other 
scholars likely picked up on this cultural motivation for participation in civil war is 
their use of qualitative methods rather than reliance upon statistical analysis.    
A fourth primary school of thought that has been established in the civil 
war sub-field has asserted that the propensity for civil war relies on the 
opportunity to fight. This school argues that if any of the other reasons were a 
sufficient condition alone for civil wars to occur, then there would have been far 
more civil wars than there have been. Therefore, there must be conditions 
occurring in these countries that allow for civil war to occur (Fearon and Laitin 
2003). Though numerous measures are used for this term, it can be boiled down 
to opportunity. This means that structural conditions exist within a country that 
increases the likelihood of people to believe that a civil war could succeed. 
Regarding their measurement these conditions range from having a large 
population to the presence of inaccessible terrain (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Each 
of these features though similarly enhances the ability of non-state actors to face 
the state with some degree of success. 
From these works, and the lack of a conclusive answer, scholarship 
exploded in a multitude of different directions. Some scholarship has highlighted 
the geographical layout of countries and their population distributions (Buhaug 
and Gates 2002, and Raleigh and Hegre 2009). Still, others have cited the 
significant presence of refugees (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006), declining state 
capacity (Theis 2010), increasing globalization (Olzak 2011), and even rising 
temperatures indirectly (Burke et al. 2009).   
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Contentious Politics 
Contentious politics is a term that was championed primarily by two 
scholars throughout the last decade of the twentieth century. Their continued 
application and refinement of the term has ensured that it remains in the 
vernacular of political scientists today. There are three components to 
contentious politics; contention, collective action, and politics (Tilly and Tarrow 
2015, p. 7-10). To be more specific, contentious politics occur where these three 
ideas coalesce. Contention is defined in its most basic form as a claim made by 
an actor against another actor (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015, p. 7). For example, asking 
someone who borrowed money from you to give it back, is a claim made on 
them. This gets more complex as more actors are involved, and as the claims 
increase in complexity, but at its most basic structure it is a claims-making action. 
The synchronized struggle on behalf of some shared cause, belief, or program is 
the definition given for collective action (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, p. 8). Collective 
action implies both the presence of multiple individuals who have organized 
themselves in some degree and the shared belief in some program or policy or 
other interest that they feel is worth exerting effort for. Collective action can take 
many forms, from an international boycott of a product to the organization of a 
petition to challenge a local policy. Finally, neither contention nor collective action 
by themselves is necessarily political; it only becomes political when government 
agents become involved. The government can be involved in many different 
ways. It can be the target of the claim of contention, it can become involved in an 
effort to keep the peace at a collective action event, or it can be a guarantor for a 
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successfully contentious movement. However, it is only once a government 
agent or agency is involved that a movement, that can be described as 
contentious and relying upon collective action, that a movement can be said to 
be a part of contentious politics. The main conclusion from this work, though, is 
that a wide array of forms of political events can, and should be taken into 
account: “Once we take the analysis to the level of mechanisms and processes, 
we discover that similar causes and effects operate across the whole range of 
contentious politics, from viciously violent to pristinely peaceful” (Tilly and Tarrow 
2015, p. 188). 
Fortunately, the literature in contentious politics and the mechanisms 
driving the increase in contentious politics has mirrored the civil war literature in 
forwarding casual process. The only exception to this is that there is no literature 
within contentious politics that advance the claim that people are driven to 
engage in contentious politics on the basis of greed. That seemingly makes 
theoretical sense, as the increased range of activities implies that monetary gain 
as a motivator diminishes overall since there are cases in which the gains 
economically would undoubtedly not be enduring. 
The idea that ideology, religion, or some other primary cultural motivator 
exists propelling people to engage in contentious politics is well established 
within the literature. Some scholars have chosen to highlight the ability of 
overarching ideologies to successfully unite and mobilize people for contentious 
politics (Barrie 2017). Other scholars have looked at the role of religion in 
promoting contentious politics (Johnston and Alimi 2012). Others still have 
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continued the legacy of advocating for broad cultural characteristics that are the 
cause of increasing contentious politics (Lynch 2014). 
Grievance based accounts of contention are also well accounted for, 
seemingly a natural continuation of the work by scholars that focused exclusively 
on civil wars. For example, the thesis that grievances and their ability to promote 
political disorder exist not as a linear relationship but as a non-linear one has 
been adopted by scholars of contentious politics (Shaddmehr 2014). This has 
been supplemented by works that look more broadly as socio-financial inequality 
and its ability to promote contentious politics aimed at redistributive policy 
outcomes (Mew 2013). 
There are even works that have taken up the mantle of promoting the 
spatial aspect of contentious politics. Following along the lines of theories 
focusing on terrain and opportunity, two lines of inquiry have arisen in 
contentious politics. On the one hand, there has been scholarship focusing on 
the specific terrain surrounding contentious politics and its ability to increase 
participation (Simmons 2005). Others though have asserted that spatial 
relationships in cities revolve around social networks. Therefore the social 
structure of a city or country is also a form of terrain (Eder and Ozlem 2016, and 
Zemni 2017). There have been several other works that examine the role of 
media (Leung 2015, and Bennett and Segerberg 2012, for example) and 
weakening governments and government security (Hazbun 2016). 
The significant conclusion from the literature on both civil war and 
contentious politics is that there are similarities running through both regarding 
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the causes that they assert are to blame for their events. This lends credit both to 
the inclusion of the multitude of events that are part of this research project, but 
also to the need to examine both classes of literature. 
Alternative Hypotheses 
From the existing collective literature from these two scholarly traditions, 
seven alternative hypotheses are apparent. These seven alternative hypotheses 
can be viewed in Figure 1 of the Appendix. Each of these differing theories 
represents a possible alternative explanation for increasing countries propensity 
for political disorder. However, before turning to focus on this paper’s theory, it is 
useful to examine briefly some relevant literature linking political disorder and 
regime type. 
The Hybrid-Disorder Linkage 
Four works that have been most influential in the realm of overlap 
between hybrid regimes, and political violence. These are the works by Urdal and 
Hoelscher (2012), Goldsmith (2010), Hegre et al. (2001), and Geddes (2018). All 
of these works have directly made the link between regime type and political 
disorder. 
The work by Urdal and Hoelscher informs this thesis in some ways. This 
work served to highlight the strengths of the PRIO dataset on Urban Social 
Disorder. In order to do this a plethora of random independent variables were 
attached to the data. Thus, while there is some similarty between the works 
regarding the measurement strategy of the dependent variable, only brief 
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attention is paid to the other variables, and the conclusions to be drawn. 
Furthermore, there is scant attention paid to the statistical finding with regards to 
regime type on disorder. As a result, while statistically sound, this work does not 
make logical connections to causal mechanisms to be thought of as an adequate 
exploration. This work cannot, however, be understated in terms of informing this 
current project. In fact, it is precisely the gap left in both the literature at large and 
in this work that this thesis hopes to be able to fill. 
The article by Goldsmith, on the other hand, is far more skeptical about 
the relationship observed in his work. The work broadly explores the perplexing 
continuation of levels of political violence of in African states, despite a notable 
decrease in purely authoritarian regimes. While statistically able to demonstrate 
that hybrid, or, as they are described in the article, semi-democratic regimes, are 
more likely to experience political violence when compared with consolidated 
autocracies and full democracies, no general mechanism is presented for the 
results, and thus they are attributed to unobserved factors instead (Goldsmith 
2010). This further indicates that ample statistical evidence for the project exists 
in scholarship, yet no major attempt has been made to link this statistical 
evidence to a causal mechanism. 
The relationship between regime type and the probability of civil war is 
explored by Hegre et al. (2001). Focusing on democratic transition Hegre et al. 
show that semidemocracies, as they label them, are far more likely to experience 
political violence in the form of civil war. They also include a time variable as a 
significant factor for the project, incorporating time since the last regime change. 
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The findings of the article are that semidemocracies are the regimes that are 
most vulnerable to civil war (Hegre et al. 2001, pg. 39). While the authors 
highlight this vulnerability as evidence that democratic transition is even more 
likely due to the relative advantage of democratic stability, it is also true that 
autocracies in their findings enjoyed a similar level of stability. Thus, while their 
reported findings are predisposed in favor of democratization, it is fair to say that 
their findings are in line with the expectations of this paper. Ultimately, the 
expectations gleaned from this article are self-destructive in the sense that since 
they are purporting the inevitability of these semidemocracies eventually 
transitioning to democracies, then some explanation needs to be provided for 
their continued survival, and continued appearance on the global stage. Since 
the authors do not account for this in their article, it is left as a gap in the 
literature, one this paper hopes to address. 
The article by Geddes offers the least direct, but perhaps most pertinent 
exploration of the linkage between hybrid regimes and political disorder. Utilizing 
Russia as a case study, an examination of regime hybridity and regime survival 
via institutions is conducted. While there is no direct reference to political 
violence, it is apparent that for a regime to survive, political violence is one 
obstacle that must be overcome. The article highlights the usage of the courts as 
a tool by which the government could leverage continued autocratic practices at 
the national level, with concessions at the local level (Geddes 2018, pg. 599). 
This article shares a focus both on regime survival, and on institutions with this 
paper. The case study portion of this thesis will emphasize the way institutions 
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can be leveraged to simultaneously cause hybrid regimes to experience a higher 
level of political disobedience events, and also to increase regime survival. The 
main weakness of this article is the reliance on anecdotal evidence from the 
Russian case without offering either data or strong qualitative evidence. 
From here, the paper will turn to explain the theory that accounts for the 
proposed relationship between political disorder and regime hybridity. 
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3. THEORY
There are several questions that this thesis will attempt to contribute. 
These specific questions are: Are hybrid regimes likely to display a higher 
propensity for political disobedience events? Do hybrid regimes display a 
propensity for a specific type of political disorder? What characteristics within 
hybrid regimes results in the increased propensity for political disorder? 
By providing some evidence in helping to fill in these gaps, the hope is to 
provide a better overall understanding of both of these essential and hefty topics. 
The way in which these questions will be answered will be addressed more fully 
in section 4. However, this section of the paper will concern itself mainly with the 
theory for the proposed relationship between regime hybridity, and political 
disorder. 
Before turning to the theory though, it is prudent to first provide a definition 
for the dependent variable (political disorder) and independent variable (regime 
hybridity). The dependent variable for the thesis is political disorder. Political 
disorder is a vague term that encompasses a wide array of actions. The definition 
employed for political disorder in this work is “different forms of violent and 
nonviolent politically motivated disorder, including demonstrations, rioting, 
terrorism, and armed conflict” (Urdal and Hoelscher 2012, pg. 516). While some 
scholars may wish to delineate these activities to a greater degree, theoretically it 
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may be helpful to group them all together. By choosing to leave all these 
activities grouped and under an umbrella term of political disorder, it preserves 
the idea that all these activities, though to markedly different degrees, share a 
common trait, which is essential for the theory of this thesis. This characteristic of 
all forms of political disorder and the hurdle that all of them must overcome if they 
are to come to fruition, is collective action. 
The independent variable for the thesis is regime hybridity. The definition 
of a hybrid regime employed by this paper is, in actuality, going to stem from the 
definition from hybrid regime scholarship that has proliferated most widely. The 
definition employed in Competitive Authoritarianism has been the most concise 
and thus the most applicable definition. Furthermore, even though the 
measurement strategy employed for identifying a competitive authoritarian 
regime is more stringent than the measurement utilized here, the baseline is the 
same. The definition of a competitive authoritarian regime is provided below: 
Competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal 
democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means 
of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them 
at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents (Levitsky and Way 
2010, p.5). 
The further caveat is added that at least one of three significant 
cornerstones of democracy is violated: free elections, comprehensive protection 
of civil liberties, and a reasonably fair contest (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 7). Of 
most importantance though, and the reason this definition is employed over the 
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others that exist is the consideration given to institutions. A media environment 
that has some degree of independence, a judiciary that is at least semi-
independent, and a visible opposition (usually in the form of opposition parties) 
are all critical components of a hybrid regime. 
With both the dependent and independent variables having been suitably 
explained and defined, attention will now turn to the theory. 
The Hybrid Paradox Theory 
The theory of this thesis is a theory of institutional structure, one that 
asserts that the structural conditions presented by a regime type will play a role 
in determining the propensity for political disorder. Relating this to the dependent 
variable, the shared trait between the swath of activities included in the definition 
of the dependent variable is collective action. 
Collective action is oft cited as a problem for many political and non-
political activities. In essence, in order for an activity such as a protest to occur, 
the collective action problem must be overcome. In this scenario, as collective 
action relates to political disorder, there are two primary components that must 
be met in order for the collective action problem to be overcome: the need to 
engage in political disorder, and the will to engage in political disorder.Therefore, 
any time an individual is considering engaging in political disorder, they must 
weigh on one hand the need to engage, and on the other hand the will to 
engage. This theory asserts that both the will and the need to engage in political 
disorder change drastically as you move across regime types. 
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In this instance, need means that the goal of the would-be participants can 
only be achieved through extra-political means. The possible goals of these 
would-be participants are wide-ranging, from changes in policy, to access to 
political power, to ceding of territory or independence. However, the main 
connector is that all of these goals would be unobtainable by working through the 
political system. Thus, the would-be participants are forced to work outside of the 
current political system to attempt to achieve their goal or goals. Going outside of 
the political system, in this instance, would mean engaging in political disorder. 
Will in this instance means accepting the consequences of engaging in political 
disorder. Again, consequences can range greatly. At one end of the spectrum, 
the consequences in engaging in political disorder are merely the cost of time 
and energy to join in; at the other extreme is the potential of death. 
Democratic regimes are typically designed in such a way that there are a 
plethora of institutions (both formal and informal) with which people may attempt 
to enact change, or merely vent political frustrations. Thus, democratic states are 
given the benefit of having institutions which directly reduce the need for major 
political disorder in the first place. Therefore, democracies would be expected to 
experience political disorder only in dire situations. 
Democracies do not really have very few institutions to reduce the will of 
its citizens. Democratic citizens engaging in political disorder (at least the mild 
forms) face relatively low-cost consequences, for example, a fine, or a small 
amount of jail time. Summarily, democracies rely on institutions to handle or 
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diffuse grievances that the state may be presented with, and thus prevention is 
the key for democracies confronted with political disobedience events. 
Authoritarian states, on the other hand, mostly do not possess the same 
institutions that are able to prevent the need for political disobedience events. 
Prevention through institutions is not a way in which Authoritarian states can deal 
with political disobedience. However, it is not the only means of prevention. 
Instead, authoritarian regimes are typically far less hesitant in employing coercive 
force in a more liberal way against their own populace than democratic states. 
Authoritarian states (assuming the capacity exists) are able to use their militaries 
to squash political disobedience events that they do not like. For most 
authoritarian leaders, the use of military force in this manner is likely a calculus 
between regime survival and potential repercussions. These rulers are able to 
use the military force because they don’t have the same fear of electoral reprisal 
that democracies do, and their power is derived mainly from fear, or respect, or a 
mixture of the two. Authoritarians may be incentivized to be heavy-handed in 
their dealings with political disobedience, as citizens who witness the crackdown 
and see the results could, in theory, be much less likely to participate in such 
events again. Thus, authoritarian regimes are able to use force to bring these 
events to a swift end, and they are also able to gain some manner of prevention 
of these events occurring due to the reduction in the will of their populace to 
engage in political disorder. 
Hybrid states have, at best, flawed versions of their counter-parts’ 
institutions of dealing with political disorder, and at worst have none of the same 
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resources. They lack many of the democratic institutions which negate the need 
for individuals to participate in political disorder. They also lack the same 
authoritarian freedom in employing coercive force against their populace. In fact, 
this theory asserts that rather than just lacking institutions which lessen the 
occurrences of political disorder, hybrid regimes may be burdened with 
institutions that invite political disorder. 
Of the totality of institutions that make up a hybrid regime, three are 
identified in this thesis as institutions that may lead to the increased propensity 
for political disorder displayed by hybrid regimes. These three institutions are the 
biased media environment, a semi-independent judiciary, and a crippled, but 
visible opposition movement which is allowed to exist. Each of these institutions 
may serve to lower the barrier to collective action, as discussed earlier; political 
disorder is reliant, no matter the form, on some degree of collective action. Each 
of these institutions then makes it easier for individuals to engage in political 
disorder because it lowers the cost of choosing to engage. In this paper, this is 
the causal mechanism, the underlying interactions that are occurring within the 
regime responsible for the hypothesized relationship. The causal mechanism 
deals directly with state institutions, capacity, and will. The duality of hybrid 
regimes is the very thing that ensures that they fail to capitalize on the benefits 
provided to either authoritarian regimes with their use of coercive force, or 
democracies and their plasticity. 
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The Three Institutions 
Before turning to these causal mechanisms, it is important to note two 
things. First, this is a structural theory overall, one that expects that the structure 
of the government, how it is organized, and the rules and regulations employed, 
will lead to an increase in propensity for political disorder. Thus, it is unlikely that 
one institution in isolation or rule could hope to have such a dramatic effect on 
the state. This means that at a single point in time all three, or any combination of 
the three causal mechanisms here may be at work. However, and the second 
point, is that the institution to which this thesis will pay the closest attention 
throughout the case-study section of the paper is the opposition party. This is the 
institution that is viewed by this paper as being the most profound in its effect. It 
also serves to tie back into the measure of the independent variable. Polity 
essentially is a scale of how competitive a regime is. Thus, by selecting 
opposition parties as the institution that is expected to have the most 
considerable magnitude of the effect, the causal mechanism is tied indirectly with 
the measurement strategy employed. 
Opposition Parties 
As identified by Levitsky and Way (2010) a key feature of hybrid regimes 
is that they hold elections (p. 11). Unlike authoritarian regimes, this allows a 
chance for the opposition to operate within public visibility. While this opposition 
may face serious obstacles in terms of their ability to compete in elections, their 
very existence is primarily the concern of this project. In an authoritarian setting 
one major obstacle to collective action is an effort made to stamp out visible 
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opposition to the government. However, in a democratic setting, opposition 
parties represent real alternatives to the current regime. Thus, in democracies 
opposition parties serve to reduce the need, and thus raise the collective action 
bar, for individuals to engage in political disorder. When in a hybrid regime a 
visible but disadvantaged opposition exists, people have an easier time deciding 
to participate; they know that they are not going to be the first person to take to 
the streets. The party serves as that first group that has already stepped up to 
challenge the regime. Thus people can at times feel safer in their participation in 
political disorder against the regimes. An opposition party’s importance is 
emphasized even further when you consider the networks and organizational 
structure that parties likely employ in elections. This same network then can be 
employed in mobilizing individuals against the government at critical times. One 
of the most challenging tasks, especially in a system that would repress public 
messages, is organizing the many facets of public disorder. 
In addition, hybrid regimes have a flaw identified by scholars of democracy 
common to presidential systems. The elections and their next occurrence are 
known in advance and thus citizens, especially those who are politically 
frustrated, or all together disenfranchised, have a visible window where political 
disorder may be especially useful. Combine this with the uncertainty that 
accompanies all multiparty elections, and it is easy to see how patterns of the 
disorder may arise around these periods. 
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Media Environment 
Unlike in authoritarian settings, the media is typically allowed some 
freedom in hybrid regimes. This means that unlike in authoritarian regimes hybrid 
regimes do not get total control of the flow of information. Authoritarian regimes 
typically have their own state-run media which doles out to the public only the 
information that they choose to disseminate. Alternatively, the media 
environment in democracies may lend itself to oversaturation of information. By 
giving citizens the information about dozens of protest events and opportunities, 
they may become overwhelmed. While there may be a state-run media 
environment in some hybrid regimes, there is indeed not the same level of 
governmental control and crackdown. A media that is allowed at least some 
independence then may increase a regime’s propensity for political disorder in a 
number of crucial ways. 
First, the media, at crucial times may decide to act independently and 
disseminate information. This dissemination of information counter to the 
regime's wishes may alert individuals to the need to engage in disorder. For 
example, the media may choose to show images of government-sanctioned 
violence being carried out or symbolic images of individuals resisting the 
government. Or, on the tamer end of the spectrum, they may merely inform 
citizens of a law that is being proposed that is unpopular or notify them of the 
extravagant lifestyles government officials are leading on the citizens dime. 
Disregarding the exact nature of the information that is being passed along, each 
of these instances is making widely known a reason or need to engage in 
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political disorder. Thus, being able to be cued in on the need to react or act, may 
lead directly to an overall increase in the number of times. 
Second, it is widely understood that the media’s slant or position on an 
issue is able to some degree to inform the opinion of its consumers.3 Thus, the 
presence of a media outlet that takes a negative stance, or at least not entirely 
positive stance, toward the government may result in an increase of overall 
dissatisfaction with the government. In an authoritarian regime almost all media 
outlets are likely to provide to the consumers a story which gives the most 
favorable view of the government; whether it be a new policy, the leader's 
performance, or a government project, they are bound to be described positively. 
However, the control of the media’s slant is likely to be far laxer in hybrid 
regimes. Therefore, there may be more articles presenting a more pragmatic or 
cynical view of the government which in turn leads to an overall increase in 
negative perception. This overall increase in negative perception would again 
make readily known to individuals that there is a reason to protest. The media 
outlet could even act as a network to enable people of the same disposition 
towards the government to connect and organize. 
Independent Judiciary 
One of the primary considerations for individuals who decide to engage in 
political disorder against the government is the risk-reward calculation. One 
institutional aspect that can alter the perception of how risky it will be to engage 
3 Though some debate exists as to the direction of the causal arrow, that seems decidedly less important 
in this specific scenario. 
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in political disorder is an independent judiciary. In some regimes, the judiciary, 
insofar as it exists at all, is basically a puppet of the ruler. This means that those 
individuals who are arrested while participating in political disorder must expect 
the sentence to be filled with the cruelty of the ruler they have just contended 
with. In democracies, judiciaries can act as an avenue of policy production (or 
removal). By being able to sue the government, or government agents, citizens 
are able to change policy and thus, individuals are offered an alternative to 
protesting. However, in hybrid regime settings, this is not necessarily the case. 
While the judiciary is not always entirely independent in these regimes, it is also 
true that there are cases where they are allowed to act with reasonable 
autonomy (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 14). In such cases, the fear of 
repercussions for acting against the government is lessened. Instead of facing 
the potential for direct reprisal individuals engaged in political disorder are offered 
the supposed impartial view offered by a judge. Thus, when making the decision 
of whether engaging in disorder against the state is worthwhile, an independent 
judiciary has the capacity to alter the risk perception enough that more people 
are willing to engage. 
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN
This study employs a mixed-method approach utilizing both statistical 
analyses, and a case study. This strategy is utilized with the aim of having both 
methods working hand-in-hand both to enhance reliability and better explore the 
hypothesized relationship. This strategy follows in line with the selection of an 
“on-the-line” case forwarded by the scholar Lieberman when discussing mixed 
method research designs (Lieberman 2005, pg. 444). It is also helpful both in 
establishing the overall hypothesis with regards to regime hybridity, and in 
allowing for the causal mechanism to be observed. From here, the discussion will 
first focus upon the statistical analysis before turning to the case study. 
Statistical Analysis 
First, the Peace Research Institute of Oslo’s (PRIO from henceforth) 
Urban Social Disorder dataset4 is employed in measuring the dependent variable 
of political disobedience events. The PRIO dataset on Urban and Social disorder 
measures events, as has been mentioned above for the largest (by population) 
cities in the Southern hemisphere of the globe. This data set is structured such 
that political disobedience events are measured at the city level rather than the 
country level. While there may be some reasonable concern about only 
4 Urdal, Henrik & Kristian Hoelscher 2012. ‘Explaining urban social disorder and violence: An empirical study 
of event data from Asian and Sub-Saharan African cities’, International Interactions 38(4): 512–528. 
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measuring single city level political disobedience events, the data set is perfect 
for a cross-national comparative study, as there is a level of control added by 
only examining cities as opposed to entire countries. Before focusing on the 
benefits of this type of measure it is necessary to point out that it is unknown 
what the statistical ramifications are of having a nested model with all variables 
aside from the dependent variable measured at only one level. Specifically, there 
is less concern which needs to be paid to ‘inhospitable terrain’ which is proven to 
make conducting certain forms of anti-governmental actions more feasible. It is 
important to note, however, that there are several instances within the data set in 
which a single country may have two or three cities represented. In order to 
statistically account for this controls are added to the dataset for any countries 
that have more than one city represented. Furthermore, the dependent variable 
is measured yearly, thus, resulting in a dataset that has observations at the city-
year level. There are 2,375 observations in the dataset. 
Several notable alterations have been made to the original dataset. First, 
in the original form of the data, the date ranges from 1960 to 2014; this has been 
narrowed for this project to range only from 1990 to 2014. There are several 
reasons supporting this artificial reduction in the number of observations. First, all 
observations will occur in a post-cold war time frame; this is especially important 
for the post-Soviet states in Central Asia and the Caucuses region. Additionally, 
this reduction also allows for superior data availability; in a pre-soviet period, 
there is less continuity of the data which represent the independent variable, 
alternative hypothesis, and controls. 
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The second alteration of the data set applies specifically to the post-Soviet 
states in the data set. In order to allow the measures of these states to gain 
accuracy, the observations for these states only cover the time frame from 1992-
2014. By removing the 1990 and 1991 observations, one hopes that the 
measures have had time to reach an accurate level of measurement, as the 
countries gained independence so recently. This is reasonably supported by data 
availability, as measures for these countries mainly, though not exclusively, 
become available only in 1992. 
Finally, the dependent variable within the data set, political disobedience 
events, is measured in a generic count form in the original dataset which includes 
all types of events. This variable is called NEVENTS. NEVENTS has a range of 0 
to 29 and a mean of 1.576. 
Additionally, it has a measure for events in which deaths have been 
recorded and those in which no deaths have been recorded. Adding to these 
measures a binary variable has been added, in which a country receives a 1 if 
during that year there was at least one event recorded, and a 0 if no events were 
recorded. Approximately 51 percent of the observations in the dataset were 
years in which an event occurred. This binary measure is utilized for additional 
statistical reliability. 
One of the most widely utilized and accepted measures of regime type is a 
country’s Polity score; this is the measure which conceptual meets the 
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requirements for measuring the independent variable.5 Polity is a twenty-one 
point scale which ranges from negative ten, for a regime that is fully authoritarian, 
to positive ten, for a regime that is fully democratic. It is the middle portion of this 
range, from negative five to positive five, where hybrid regimes are typically 
classified. It is prudent to point out that some contestation exists over this 
measure, with different scholars recommending their own delineations of Polity. 
This contestation is largely circumvented in this study by instead employing a 
measure of Polity which has had several transformations done to it. First, the 
measure of Polity was squared, thus folding the measure and placing at one end 
of the spectrum all regimes that are fully democratic or authoritarian, and then at 
the other end all hybrid regimes, thus turning the measure into a measure of 
hybridity. Then, the measure was scaled from 0 to 1 with 1 representing a fully 
hybrid regime, and a 0 either fully democratic or fully authoritarian regime. The 
measure of Hybridity has a mean of 0.575, indicating that the units in the study 
are on average slightly more hybrid than not. The outlay of the hybridity measure 
is displayed below in Graph 1. 
5 POLITY IV PROJECT: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013 (2014) by Monty G. 
Marshall, Ted R. Gurr, Keith Jaggers 
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Furthermore, as an additional measure of reliability and validity, a second 
measure is employed. By utilizing the Varieties of Democracy project measure of 
polyarchy, which has received a transformation identical to that of the Polity 
score, the hope is that the statistical findings can be viewed will more trust and 
be seen as valid. This is important as relying upon a single measure for the 
independent variable without and validation of its ability to measure what it is 
intended to measure, runs the risk of the results being spurious. The measure of 
Hybridity from the V-Dem project has a mean of 0.542, which is slightly less 
hybrid than the measure from Polity, but overall still indicates that the sample has 
more hybrid cases than not. 
Three variables within the data set represent control variables for the 
purpose of this project. The first of these control variables is a simple binary 
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variable which measures whether or not the city is the de facto capital of the 
country. A country’s capital may hold symbolic political importance, and therefore 
may experience a higher level of political disorder events, or as the seat of 
government, power may be subject to far more control and governmental 
supervision and thus experience lower levels of political disorder events. In either 
case, the inclusion of this variable as a control allows the statistical test to 
function without bias being introduced from capital cities. 
The second control variable employed is a binary variable for the years 
1990-1995. This variable is included to control for effects that may have resulted 
from the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet-bloc. During this 
turbulent time, countries may have experienced higher levels of disorder than 
would otherwise be normal. This variable is also binary, with years falling 
between 1990 and 1995 receiving a 1 and all other years receiving a 0. 
Finally, the level of internet penetration is added as a control variable to 
help deal with the differing levels of the media environment. Countries that during 
the time period, consistently had higher levels of internet penetration may have 
had an easier time in documenting the political disobedience events that occur 
within the country. In short, by being able to post to the internet that an event 
occurred these countries may have higher levels of political disobedience events 
due to better reporting. 
Furthermore, eight variables are included in hopes of accurately 
representing the alternative hypothesis. These eight variables are included below 







Percent of Population which resides in an 
urban setting. H9
HDI 
A measure of how well a country is able to 




The change in a Countries GDP from the 
previous year, lagged by a year. H9 
Trade 
A Countries Trade income as a percentage of 
its GDP H6
KOF A measure of Globalization of a country H7
GDP (PPP) 
The average income for a citizen of a country 




Level of Economic Inequality present within a 
country H4
MINERAL 
The amount of revenue produced by a country 
through the sale of valuable minerals (i.e., 
diamonds) H5
*
It is acknowledged that neither of these measures adequately captures the nuance of 
alternative hypothesis 3. However, no adequate measure of ethnic and religious 
divisions could be found for the countries within the dataset. 
Of note in the above table is the absence of alternative hypothesis 8; this 
is because, as mentioned in the literature review, this hypothesis has up to this 
point only be tested and studied using qualitative methods. This study makes no 
attempts to bring statistical analysis to bear on a hypothesis which is best studied 
utilizing qualitative methods, though special attention will be paid to this 
hypothesis during the case study section of the paper. 
6 The GINI coefficient is included within the dataset; even though it cannot be used as a control, due to 
the very limited number of cases in which there is no measure for GINI is very high, dropping the n from 
2,150 to 705. More important than the sheer number of cases dropped is also the consideration of which 
cases are dropped. In other words, it is likely that the cases dropped all share some common variable 
about them. Thus, the results from including the GINI coefficient are not displayed in the tables above. 
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Case Study 
The purpose of this case study is again, to provide some measure of 
reliability for the previous statistical analysis, but more importantly, it is also to 
provide illumination of the proposed causal mechanism. In this instance, clear 
evidence and illumination are needed of opposition parties functioning as the 
mechanism by which Algeria is experiencing a more significant number of 
political disorder events. Thus, if this is the case three things should be apparent 
in the content analysis of newspaper articles from Nexus Uni. First opposition 
parties should be directly named concerning the political disorder events. 
Second, the opposition parties in Algeria should be cited as the perpetrator of the 
disorder, not the recipient (as it could be the case that the events occurring are 
ones in which the government is the instigator). Finally, mention should be given 
for the goals of the opposition party concerning the political disorder events. 
Specifically, there should be some politically motivated goal which the political 
disorder is aimed at achieving, and this goal should be readily apparent. 
The case study on Algiers is conducted by utilizing NexisUni to search all 
Newspaper articles and broadcast transcripts from 1997, which specifically 
mentioned Algiers and at least one of a handful of search terms relating to 
political disorder.7 
It is necessary to expand on how and why Algiers, Algeria, was chosen as 
the case to study. In selecting a case, it was first necessary to find cases that 
7 The search terms utilized were; violence, protest, riots, demonstrations, and disorder. 
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both were consistently hybrid and experienced high levels of political disorder. 
This strategy is known as selecting a case that is “on-the-line” and is useful for 
selecting a case that illustrates the theory (Lieberman 2005, pg. 444) While 
several cities in the dataset meet the basic requirements outlined above, Algiers, 
Algeria is the final selection. 
Below graph 2 displays the transformed Polity score or the score of 
regime hybridity for Algeria throughout the timeframe of the data, 1990-2014. 
With the exception of a few years in the early 1990s, Algeria has remained 
unquestionably hybrid throughout the time frame of the study. 
Graph 3 below displays the yearly number of political disorder events that 
the city of Algiers experienced during the period of the data. Algiers on average 
experienced 5.360 yearly political disorder events, while the rest of the data has 
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a yearly average of 1.576. Algeria consistently ranges above this average. 
Furthermore, graph 3 helped select the year that would be focused on in the 
case study.8 The year 1997 is the year which the case study will focus upon. 
Finally, when comparing Algiers to the average of the dataset, it becomes 
apparent that Algiers is well situated. As can be seen in Table 2 below, Algiers is 
well situated within the dataset in that excepting the independent variable, and 
the dependent variable, Algiers is very close to all of the average values for the 
data set. It is clear when examining the dependent variable that Algiers has 
experienced a higher than average number of political disorder events. This 
observation is valid both when looking at the average number of events 5.360 vs. 
8 Due to the space limitations of the paper, it was not feasible to focus upon the full range of years. 
Therefore, it was prudent to find a year that was most likely to provide insight for the causal mechanism. 
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1.576 and at the percentage of years in which an event occurred, 0.720 
compared to 0.510 of the average for the dataset. Additionally, Algeria is 
considered to be more hybrid than the average regime in the dataset, and this is 
also true when looking at either the Polity score variable or the V-Dem score 
variable. Thus, Algiers is a well-poised case study for this project. 
TABLE 2 
Algiers, Algeria Average 
Number of Events 5.360 1.576 
Events Occurring 0.720 0.510 
Regime Hybridity 0.88 0.575 
V-Dem Hybridity 0.656 0.542 
HDI 0.638 0.530 
Lag Change in GDP 0.386 0.395 
Urbanicity 0.592 0.458 
Trade 0.136 0.156 
Internet 0.061 0.106 
KOF 0.415 0.433 
GDP(PPP) 0.050 0.062 
Mineral 0.196 0.118 
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5. STATISTICAL RESULTS
One of the best ways to examine a proposed relationship is to view the 
dependent and independent variables together graphically. This is what Graph 4 
does; it is a scatterplot of the number of political disorder events observed on the 
Y-axis, and the regime hybridity on the X-axis. 
This graph shows a decent relationship between hybridity and number of 
events, as it is discernible that moving from 0 to 1 on the X-axis, the number of 
average events increases. Employing a simple linear regression between only 
the dependent and independent variables, displays a coefficient of 0.823 for 
regime hybridity, with a standard error of 0.197 (the p-value is 0.000).9 This is a 
9 When using the V-dem measure the coefficient rises to 1.115 with a standard error of 0.217 and a p-
value of 0.000 
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small increase of about one additional event in a year if a regime is fully hybrid, 
as compared to being fully democratic or autocratic. However, as discussed 
above, the dependent measure, number of events, is a count variable; thus, 
utilizing standard linear regression is not necessarily the most effective strategy. 
For correctly measuring the hypothesized relationship with this dependent 
and independent variable it is necessary to employ a more advanced statistical 
regression technique. In this instance, the decision must be between using 
Poisson, or Negative-Binomial regression. In this instance, it is more appropriate 
to use the Negative-Binomial model, as the data does not fit a Poisson 
distribution. This is highlighted in Graph 5 which shows an overdispersion of 
2.039, when the standard is a 0 if the Poisson model would fit as well, or better 
than the Negative-Binomial model. This is also affirmed when comparing the 
mean of the variable NEVENTS with the variance, the mean is 1.576, while the 
variance is 7.365, the variance is approximately five times larger than the mean. 
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Negative-binomial Regression Model 
TABLE 3 
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Other unmentioned variables included in the regression model include a control for the 
post-cold war period, a control for whether the city served as a capital for the country, 
and controls for countries which included more than one city within the dataset. 
Table 3 reveals two noteworthy observations. First, regime hybridity 
significantly increases the chances of a country experiencing a political disorder 
event, even when holding all other variables at their means. Secondly, though, it 
is surprising that the Human Development Index indicator also indicates that an 
increase in HDI also warrants an increased likelihood of experiencing political 
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disorder events. Thus, before focusing on the findings related to the independent 
variable, a few words shall be said regarding HDI. There are several reasons 
which make it reasonable to see this relationship which at first may be 
perplexing. First, HDI may correspond with a better ability to report or detect the 
events occurring. In countries where HDI is higher, there is an accompanying 
increase in literacy and infrastructure which makes recording instances of 
political disorder much easier than in countries with low HDI scores. Additionally, 
an increased HDI may correspond with the specifically non-violent activities. 
The differences between Model 2 and Model 4 is only the change of the 
measure of the independent variable. In Model 2 the transformed Polity score is 
utilized, while Model 4 makes use of the V-dem indicator. In both cases, there is 
a statistically significant increase in the number of events a unit will experience 
as hybridity increases. The graphical display of this can be seen in Graph 6. This 
indicates that a country that is fully democratic or autocratic, which transitions 
towards hybridity, will on average experience one and a half more political 
disorder events in a year.  
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While this statistical evidence is strong by itself, it is also necessary to 
examine the other form of the dependent variable, that is, the binary form of the 
variable. By focusing on whether an event occurs within a year, rather than on 
the sheer number, it is hoped that additional validity will be added to the results. 
Specifically, the hope is that any potential of numerous events occurring on years 
of turmoil or transition can be tempered. Thus, if this statistical analysis proves to 
be like that of the previous analysis, then some criticism can hope to be avoided. 
Logistic Regression Models 
Table 4 below displays the logistic regression models 1 through 4. Model’s 
1 and 2 again uses the Polity score, while model 3 and 4 uses the V-dem score. 
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TABLE 4 
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Other unmentioned variables included in the regression model include a control for the 
post-cold war period, a control for whether the city served as a capital for the country, and 
controls for countries which included more than one city within the dataset. 
The results from these two logistic regression models are very similar to that of 
the negative-binomial models discussed previously. When considering both statistical 
significances, and how that statistical significance translates to real significance, regime 
hybridity is second in importance only to HDI and is significant even when HDI is taken 
into account. Translating the statistical findings above into what it means for the 
measure, as a regime moves from fully democratic or autocratic to fully hybrid, that there 
is an increase of approximately 35 percent in the likelihood of an event occurring in a 
given year.  This increase can be seen graphically below in Graph 7. 
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The conclusions to be drawn from the statistical analysis part of this paper 
is that there is a correlation which exists between regime hybridity and political 
disorder events. However, it is not affirmed the exact nature of the relationship. 
While this paper asserts that the relationship exists with regime hybridity being 
the influencer of political disorder events occurring, it is not possible with 
statistical methods to verify this. Therefore, this paper will now turn to the content 
analysis from the case study. 
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6. ALGERIAN CONTENT ANALYSIS
Before turning to focus on the case study and the history of Algeria it is 
prudent to give answer to two obvious criticisms that could be leveled against this 
case study. 
The first of these criticisms is that the year selected, 1997, was in many 
ways an easy test year for this project. This argument is essentially that because 
1997 saw elections, that the case study is biased in favor of finding positive 
results. The second criticism is that the events seen in 1997 were primarily a 
continuation of the violence from the civil war, which in turn can be seen as 
caused by regime closure. Through this logic the conclusion is that the violence 
seen in Algeria in 1997 was a result of closure and not of hybridity. 
The year 1997 was selected as the focus of the study prior to delving into 
the case and familiarizing with the events occurring in that year. It was unknown 
that the elections were occurring in 1997 when the decision was made to focus 
on this case. In selecting the year for the study two criteria were sought, first that 
there was a high number of events in that year, and second that Algiers was a 
hybrid regime in that year. 1997 saw both criteria meet and was therefore 
selected in a Lieberman style case study selection. Finally, there is strong 
evidence that some of the events in 1997 were as a result of the elections and 
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organized by political parties, which would alleviate concerns surrounding the 
second aforementioned criticism. 
The Modern History of Algeria 
Algeria is a former colony of France, and even today maintains a close but 
tumultuous relationship with France. Upon being granted independence from 
France in 1962, Algeria was established as a secular democracy, though in 
practice the military was given a vast amount of influence and control, thus 
placing them as a hybrid regime (Mundy 2015, p. 31). This government remained 
in place until 1991. During the elections of 1991, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) 
obtained a majority vote share (Mundy 2015, p. 34). However, the governing 
political party at the time was afraid of what would happen when the FIS won the 
election (as they seemed poised to do) and seized power for itself through a 
military coup, which is why Algeria swung closer to an authoritarian regime from 
1992-1994. It is important to note that despite the government halting all 
elections and seizing power for their party the National Liberation Front, 
opposition parties did not vanish. Instead, opposition parties began organizing to 
try to force the government to hold elections again (Mundy 2015, p. 62). The FIS 
splintered into many political parties, and their presence gave credence to the 
formation of other opposition parties during the interim. These opposition parties 
adopted several strategies to try to aid in ending the violence, and in forcing the 
government to hold elections. Some of these parties focused on getting the 
attention of France, the former colonial ruler of Algeria. This effort was made in 
an attempt to get France to intervene and was primarily utilized due to the high 
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number of refugees who fled to France during the conflict, citing fear of violence 
from both the government and the insurgents. Other actors focused on drawing 
in the West; this was especially true of groups which focused their attention on 
lobbying NGO’s like amnesty international. Other actors decided that the only 
way to achieve success against the government was to force action via protests 
and violence. Observers have sometimes described the period from 1991 to 
1997 as a civil war in Algeria, with the government fighting against the Berbers 
and Islamic guerrilla fighters (Mundy 2015, p. 44). 1997, however, saw a turning 
point in this conflict, with the government relenting and opting to hold elections, 
though having barred any parties with religious affiliations (Mundy 2015, p. 81). 
Two types of violence are discernable in 1997, violence concentrated around the 
two elections held that year, and continued violence from the previous 6 years of 
fighting between the government and insurgents. Despite the reinstallation of 
supposedly democratic elections, most resistance fighters in the Armed Islamic 
Group (GIA) and the Islamic Salvation Army (SIA) did not lay down their 
weapons.10  However, there was also violence and protest corresponding to the 
two election days that took place in 1997. Both the parliamentary election which 
took place in June of 1997 and the local elections which took place in October of 
1997 were regarded with deep skepticism both by opposition parties and by 
foreign observers. The main party for the government of Algeria in 1997, the 
National Democratic Rally, was able to win the majority of seats in both the 
10 Though, after the parliamentary elections, the SIA opted to attempt to gain a truce with the 
government citing the return of elections. It is, even years later, unclear whether the truce was honored 
by both sides.  
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parliament and local elections. In both cases, the pro-government party the 
National Liberation Front, which had been the party of the government before the 
1992 coup, was awarded the second highest number of seats. These two pro-
government parties were followed by a handful of opposition parties which were 
made up of many different groups, ideologically and culturally. These groups 
ranged from parties which in all but name were Islamic in orientation, to 
communist worker parties, to labor parties, and a culturally Berber party (which 
held a strong secularist view). In the days, and weeks after the results of both the 
parliamentary and the local elections of 1997, this handful of parties held joint 
protests, accusing the government of election fraud, and pressuring for a recount 
or new elections. This was also accompanied by an increase in violence in 
Algiers following both of these elections, though no reports were made of any 
attacks taking place on either election day. 
Content Analysis 
The NexisUni archival search returned 800 total articles from the search 
function utilized. Of these 800 articles, only 540 articles were related to episodic 
political disorder related to the city of Algiers in 1997. While nearly all of the 800 
articles made at least an indirect mention to opposition parties or Islamic parties, 
the bar for this case study is set higher. Thus, there needed to be a direct 
mention of one of the opposition parties operating in Algeria in 1997. These 
opposition parties are the Islamic Salvation Front, the Assembly for Culture and 
Democracy (RCD), the Front of Socialist Forces (FSS), the Rally for Culture and 
Democracy, and the Movement for Peaceful Society. Excluded from this 
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grouping of opposition parties is the GIA and the SIA, both of which are seen as 
either a militant group or a terrorist organization by Algeria and many foreign 
countries. Though it is crucial to understand that these two organizations were 
founded as splinter groups from the FIS following the arrest of key leaders in 
1991. A division along the lines of what tactics to employ left the GIA and SIA 
splintered from the FIS, as the GIA and the SIA began a campaign of violence 
aimed at toppling the government. There is not a single article in the 540 which 
does not give mention to the GIA or the SIA, either by name directly or through 
the much-used term “Islamic militants,” which was often utilized when the attack 
was not clearly within the operating territory of either group. 
While the presence of the GIA is positive evidence of the mechanism of 
opposition party presence in increasing propensity for political disorder, there are 
some overall concerns with placing too much emphasis on this particular piece of 
evidence alone. While it is true that the GIA was unquestionably formed from the 
FIS and operated in the areas where they most heavily garnered support in the 
1991 election (“100 Algerians Are Killed In 48 Hours of Violence”, 1997). The GIA 
also show signs befitting the alternative hypotheses. Their main location or head 
of the operation was in a “mountainous region of Algeria,” thus implying that they 
choose it for its remote local befitting the alternative hypothesis H6 (“Algeria’s 
Agony” 1997). Additionally, while their initial violence may have only been to 
bring about the return of elections, they later continued to use violence for other 
means. For example, there are accounts of the GIA taking the prettiest women 
from the pro-government villages that they raided as sex slaves (Ibrahim 1997), 
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thus validating the hypothesis H4. It is also true that their cause for fighting 
represents both the lack of political opportunity and access to power, but also a 
religious overture, as they were fighting in part to allow Islam into the Algerian 
government (Cohen 1997, “A Chance to Try to End an Agony”). These 
considerations also validate H3 and H5. So, while the GIA definitively validates 
the hypothesis and causal mechanism proposed by this paper, it does an equally 
good job of supporting the alternative hypotheses. 
Of the 540 articles relevant to this content analysis, 369 directly mentioned 
opposition parties by name when discussing political disorder events — leaving 
171 articles which did not directly mention an opposition party. 
The FIS winning a majority of votes in the 1991 election was what caused 
the period of violence from 1991-1997. Despite the government banning the 
party and targeting its leaders, the FIS continued to operate within Algeria. The 
FIS did not maintain cohesion, though, as mentioned above, a group of members 
splintered off and focused on violence as the means of gaining power; others, 
however, decided to pursue the matters more peacefully (Cohen 1997, “Despite 
Freeing of a Militant, No Letup In Algerian Strife”). As mentioned above, 369 of 
the returned 540 articles or nearly seventy percent of the articles published 
during this time period, gave explicit mention to an opposition party. 
One crucial piece of evidence that stands out from the content analysis is 
the attention paid to Abbassi Madani, who was the leader of the FIS during the 
1991 elections (Cohen 1997, “Algeria’s Main Rebel Faction Takes Risk and Calls 
Truce”). Imprisoned from 1991 to 1997 Madani maintained the position or 
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appearance as the leader for the opposition. In 1997, to bring an end to the 
violence, the government released Madani from prison. Madani’s release from 
prison was very clearly viewed by the news articles as an effort made by the 
government to bring the violence that had been occurring in the country for six 
years to an end. Madani returned to his position at the head of the FIS and called 
for an end to the violence and the reestablishment of elections (“Algerian Islamic 
Activist Put Under House Arrest” 1997). Madani continues today to be the leader 
of the FIS in Algeria. The fact that these members choose to remain in the open, 
and to confront the government more peacefully, makes this evidence stronger in 
the sense that it does not sit with H4 or H6, though H3 and H8, grievances and 
cultural motivations may still be a consideration. 
Additionally, a new political party was formed from a group of former FIS 
members, calling itself the Movement of Society for Peace (“Algerian Vote Nears, 
Democracy in Ruins” 1997). It focused on appealing internationally to France and 
the United States to apply pressure to Algeria to end the violence and allow the 
return of elections. Similarly, to the main body of the FIS, it did not advocate for 
violence as a means to an end. Thus again, this evidence is marginally stronger 
than that of the FIS involvement in that overarching cultural motivations are not 
present in the MSP to the same degree as they were in the FIS. The FIS 
specifically wanted a government based on the Quran; the MSP did not call for 
those measures to the same degree (“7 Moderates Appointed to Algerian 
Government” 1997). This difference can be seen in the diverse strategies 
employed in the 1997 elections. The MSP was initially called the Hamas party, 
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but they opted to change their name to the MSP following the ban on religious 
parties. In contrast, the FIS opted to boycott the elections citing the ban as 
undemocratic and unfair. However, the MSP as evidence still fails to overcome 
the same grievance issue. 
The news articles from this content analysis were also quick to lay blame 
for the violence occurring in the country directly at the feet of the FIS. Throughout 
all of the articles explicitly focused on the violence from this period, one phrase is 
ubiquitous; “Islamic militants have been waging an insurgency against the 
military-backed government since 1992 when elections that the fundamentalist 
Islamic Salvation Front was poised to win were canceled.” This exact phrase can 
be seen throughout a lot of the articles within the sample, and even more, can be 
seen when including articles that have slightly altered the text. This phrase is 
usually either preceded or succeeded by a figure about the death toll from the 
fighting. This seems to be clear evidence that the authors of these news articles 
are at least attributing part of the blame for the ongoing violence in Algeria to the 
FIS. 
Furthermore, there are two sets of articles corresponding to the two post-
election periods in 1997, where several of the opposition parties are cited as 
instigating and organizing demonstrations, protests, riots, and walk-outs, to 
change the election results. One article specifically mentions a march on the 
capital which was organized and joined by, five of the opposition parties, and two 
of the parties in the governing coalition (Khiari 1997, “Opposition readies for new 
election protest”). There is clear evidence throughout these articles that the 
63 
opposition parties are seen as the perpetrators, rather than the victims, of these 
political disorder events. 
Finally, the goals of these parties are apparent; there is little confusion 
about their interest in terms of organizing these events. For the militant groups, 
the goal is access to power; they want to be the group that is in control of the 
country, as evinced by the myriad of references to the insurgent’s goal of 
‘toppling’ the regime. For the FIS the goal of their protest and actions was initially 
to force the government to hold elections again. However, this goal changed 
once the government banned religious, political parties from participation in the 
elections. Once the ban occurred, the FIS participated in these events in order to 
enact policy change, the lifting of the ban on participation. Finally, the opposition 
parties were concerned with forcing the government to either rehost the elections 
which were viewed as fraudulent or to initiate a recount which could confirm or 
dispel the view that the elections were rigged by the government. 
The overall evidence from the content analysis of the NexisUni articles 
reveals strong evidence for the hypothesized causal mechanism of opposition 
parties in hybrid regimes producing an increase in propensity for political 
violence. However, it also failed to reject the other possible hypotheses entirely 
and specifically failed to account for the grievance hypothesis of political 
disorder. It is worth noting that there are some reasons to be skeptical in thinking 
that this case study has presented the most reliable possible evidence. First, the 
NexisUni is not necessarily the best choice in new sources for understanding 
Algerian events; perhaps local newspapers which would write in Arabic would 
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have yielded different results. Second, utilizing news media to understand the 
events occurring in 1997 primarily from the opposition may not be ideal. The 
Algerian government in 1997 was cited throughout the news articles as restricting 
the freedom of the press in the country throughout the year as they wished to 
keep information about the attacks to a minimum. Thus, it may have been difficult 
for these parties to get information about what they were doing out to the broader 
world. Therefore, accessing party archival material from the period would have 
been another strategy that could be applicable. Also, attempting interviews with 
party leaders or members from the time could be a strategy employed to find 
evidence. However, neither of these were chosen due primarily to the language 
barrier. Finally, in attempting to form a better view of the hypothesized 
relationship, it would be ideal for a comparison to be formed between a hybrid 
regime, and a non-hybrid regime, however space limitations made that 
impossible for this project. 
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7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
When examining the summation of the evidence, and the results from the 
case study, and the statistical analysis, it seems that there is a strong indication 
that the hypothesized relationship and the outlined causal mechanism are both 
supported. 
What remains unanswered though, is the rejection of all of the alternative 
hypotheses, in particular, H3 the Grievance theory, and H8 the social identity 
theory, both are unable to be disproven or rejected. Additional work aimed 
directly at contesting either of these alternative explanations would likely yield 
more concrete evidence against them. For example, focusing more specifically 
on countries where data is available about ethnoreligious fractionalization and 
access to power is available would allow for the Grievance theory to better be 
tested. Alternatively, employing more than one case in the case study section 
may allow for the religious and social identity argument to become weakened, as 
evidence similar social identities in non-hybrid regimes not resulting in increases 
in political disorder events would be strong evidence against this theory. 
Unfortunately, both of these methods are outside of the scope of this particular 
project. 
It is prudent to examine the results from this study with two frames of 
focus, first, what does this mean in terms of scholarship, and further studying of 
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this area of focus, and second, what policy recommendations, and other real-
world insights can be gleaned. 
One important scholarly vein that has been revealed by this work is 
attempting to understand how hybrid regimes can survive despite being 
seemingly burdened by institutions which invite political disorder into society. 
Hybrid regimes experience more disorder events which threaten the very survival 
of the regime, yet they seem (at least some hybrid regimes) to remain stable. 
Algeria, for example, endured a six-plus year civil war which saw around 100,000 
Algerian civilians killed, (some estimates place the number over 100,000 some 
under 100,000) yet at no point in this bloody conflict was the government 
seemingly in fear of losing their power. Some evidence of why this may be is 
revealed in the content analysis, as some locals when asked about the violence 
by these journalists explained that the violence was being used by the 
government in order to give evidence for their continued control of power. It is 
natural to reason that so long as there is a crisis, the government can easily 
dissuade their populace from seeking any form of transition of power, at least 
until the crisis is over. 
Furthermore, there were claims that the violence was being used to keep 
the populace aligned against the Islamic insurgents. This line of thinking was 
especially avowed by those individuals who suggested that the government was 
behind at least some of the massacres. Thus, a significant line of potential future 
research should be aimed at addressing the question of how hybrid regimes 
survive. 
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Another very intriguing line of scholarly inquiry that is made clear by this 
research is the distinction of opposition. In the Algerian case, the decision was 
made to focus solely on formal organized political opposition; there is indeed an 
argument which could be made that the insurgent organization is equally 
important. It seems very clear that future inquiries could focus more heavily on 
comparing the two strategies. While Algeria simultaneously hosted both formal 
political opposition and violent insurgent opposition, other hybrid regimes 
undoubtedly only played host to one of these types of oppositions. A comparison 
of the efficacy and results of these two different types of opposition may lead to a 
clearer understanding of what type of opposition hybrid regimes can deal with, 
and what type of opposition they are unable to survive. 
Switching to focus on how this affects the practitioners of political science, 
legislators, Nongovernmental Organization workers, and other such individuals, 
there are some important findings. The first of these is the recognition that hybrid 
regimes are a distinct, and at least for now, permanent regime type in the 
international system. It is no longer useful to view these states as democracies 
not yet arrived. By viewing these regimes as independent typologies, there could 
be better policies aimed at interacting with these regimes. 
Furthermore, understanding how the institutions within a hybrid regime 
lead to their increased volatility may help policymakers seeking to help end the 
violence currently ongoing in hybrid regimes around the globe. By understanding 
what institutions are giving rise to the violence that is permeating these societies, 
there could be greater attention paid on how to fix the violence. 
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Finally, there can surely be some insight drawn from the Algerian case. 
There was a plethora of media attention given to Algeria and the violence taking 
place there, with almost one and a half news articles being published daily 
throughout 1997. There was no outside intervention to aid the civilians in Algeria. 
Despite calls for help, both from civilians and the opposition parties within 
Algeria, and from the refugees outside of Algeria, no help was given. The United 
Nations and Europe failed to answer the call for help, respecting the sovereignty 
of Algeria at the cost of tens of thousands of lives. It seems that if outside help 
had come these lives could have been saved; this is especially true if adopting 
the stance that the government was at least partially responsible for perpetrating 
the violence, as many within and outside of Algeria did at the time. While the 
government continually reassured the West that the conflict was on-going to 
protect secular democracy, it is apparent that the government was 
simultaneously violating these same democratic principles it claimed to be 
protecting. 
 In summation, this project displayed strong evidence, both statistically, 
and qualitatively that the theory within this paper is supported. This hypothesis 
stated at the beginning of this paper was, as regime hybridity increases 
occurrences of political disorder will also increase. This paper argues that that 
this hypothesized increase is due both to lack the institutions that democracies 
and authoritarian regimes enjoy that hamper the collective action problem, and 
also because hybrid regimes have institutions which aid in overcoming the 
collective action problem. Three institutions were highlighted as potentially being 
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responsible for this, the media environment, the judiciary, and opposition parties. 
Ultimately this paper focused its attention on opposition parties and found a 
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H3: If access to political power decreases along ethnic, or religious lines, 
then occurrences of political disorder will increase.  
H4: If economic inequality increases, then occurrences of political 
disorder will increase.  
H5: If the presence of loot-able resources within a country increases, 
then occurrences of political disorder will increase. 
H6: If a countries exportation of goods increases, then occurrences of 
political disorder will decrease. 
H7: If a countries globalization increases, then occurrences of political 
disorder will decrease. 
H8: If religious, ethnic, or other social identities within a country 
encourage, or promotes contestation with the government, then 
occurrences of political disorder will increase.  
H9: If the conditions within a country allow groups to contest the states 
military capability, then occurrences of political disorder will increase. 
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